Overflight, 83

“«If we do not develop our automobile industry, we are threatened with the heaviest losses, if not defeats, in a future war.» Pravda, July 20, 1927.
At the end of World War II the U.S. government appointed an interagency committee to consider the future of the German automobile industry and its war−making potential. This committee concluded that any motor vehicle industry in any country is an important factor in that country's war potential.
… «The Committee recognized without dissent that [Germany's] motor vehicle industry was an important factor in her waging of war during World War II.»
… These conclusions have been ignored for the Soviet automobile industry, even while the Soviets themselves officially stated their intention to use foreign automobile technology for military vehicles as early as 1927. V. V. Ossinsky, a top planner, wrote a series of articles for Pravda (July 20, 21 and 22, 1927) with the following warning:
«If in a future war we use the Russian peasant cart against the American or European automobile, the result to say the least will be disproportionately heavy losses, the inevitable consequences of technical weakness. …»
Almost all — possibly 95 percent — of Soviet military vehicles are produced in very large plants designed by American engineers in the 1930s through the 1970s.
… In May 1929 the Soviets signed an agreement with the Ford Motor Company of Detroit. The Soviets agreed to purchase $13 million worth of automobiles and parts and Ford agreed to give technical assistance until 1938 to construct an integrated automobile−manufacturing plant at Nizhni−Novgorod. Construction was completed in 1933 by the Austin Company … Today this plant is known as Gorki. …