From Humanoid Faults to Manipulated Consensus, 22

Instead, by being reasonable so much, the religious person ends up persuaded to consider the soul as some kind of a minor accessory, no more as sheer self. Moreover, the religious person ends up persuaded to accept the attempts to affect the individual by material means such as psychopharmaceuticals as legitimate instead of denouncing them as blasphemous.
These are huge paradoxes, and swallowing them in such a smooth, almost unwitting way is an accordingly huge reasonableness – or rather the ultimate reasonableness.

We’re unfair:

We look the wrong way at the wrong thing – we deliver our verdicts on things after having carefully reviewed something else. And this has even many forms, “vertically” as well as “horizontally”: not only we plainly misfire miserably by looking at the water temperature gauge to form an opinion on how much petrol we have in the fuel tank, but in addition we favour the package over the substance, the conspicuous over the important, the impressive over the actual, the subjective over the objective, the emotion over the logic. In other words, not only we judge the book by its cover, but we also judge it by the cover of the wrong book.
Do a test: take the very same information and carve it in marble, print it in an encyclopaedia, write it in a newspaper, and scribble it on toilet paper; or put it in the mouth of an academic, a politician, a clown and a tramp; then present it to people in each form and graph two things as a function of the medium carrying the information: the willingness to examinate it, and the willingness to blindly accept it.

That's not "human", not more than madness is. Madness leading one and all astray. And it even has a specific label: principle of authority – and it’s a fault all by itself. When we receive an information, we assign a score to how authoritative the source is and to how credible the information is, and then we assign this score to the information.