Crime Against Humanity: “National”, “Federal”, “Central” Banking, 13

As non−existent money, bank credit, caught on as an accepted medium of payment, a new pair of “promise and delivery” came into existence: bank credit and banknote; and this exemplifies how the concepts of promise and delivery can exist, and more importantly operate, in the abstract, whereby abstract means regardless of whether the delivery in question is of intrinsic value or not. The use of promise and delivery as abstract concepts here is that the fraudulent scheme of fractional reserve applies to any promise and delivery pair as such, regardless of their intrinsic or face value: from this perspective, all it consists of is passing off whatever promise as its corresponding delivery. And obviously the crime scene is the mind of the target who mistakes one for the other. Summing up the relationship of fractional reserve banking with the concepts of promise and delivery, the banker’s criminal motive for switching from 100−percent−bailee to fractional−reserve−debtor becomes crysyal clear in terms of promise and delivery: exploiting promises as deliveries is the basis of the fractional reserve swindle – it is what it consists in. And it is intrinsically counterfeiting: no circulation of promises, no point in counterfeiting fake promises for non−existing deliveries.

The basic rules of operation that matter in the central banking system, dictated by the legislator on behalf of the bosses, are as follows:
The central bank has the monopoly of the creation of banknotes.
the central bank and the other banks share the monopoly of the creation of bank credit.
People can demand both the central bank and the other banks to redeem bank credit in banknotes, but they can only demand the central bank to redeem banknotes in… what?
Conceptually, initially the central bank backs up the banknotes it issues in full with gold, then it applies fractional reserve and backs them up with gold only in part, and finally it backs them up with plain thin air. This is a case of what I call the “ambiguous money cycle”, which I discuss ahead; in parallel with it and to its logical support, it is made increasingly difficult and eventually impossible for people to demand that the central bank backs up those banknotes by redeeming them in gold or in anything at all.